

LIBYA SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING REPORT

May to August 2020



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between 1 May and 31 August 2020, our research and analysis has demonstrated that the broader trends in engagement across Libyan online discourse observed in the months following the April 2019 assault on Tripoli have largely continued to follow their previously observed trajectories.



Security and conflict remained a topic of high engagement, but there was a fairly significant drop in comparison with the previous reporting period. The lack of a major event akin to the Turkish military intervention in January meant that there was no primary focal point around which comparable levels of interest could rally. Foreign intervention and the divisive public figures of Fayez al-Sarraj, head of the Presidential Council of Libya and prime minister of the Government of National Accord of Libya (GNA), and Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), continue to be the most prominent drivers of engagement and discussion, with any mention of either factional leader or international actors usually provoking partisan reactions. The pro-LAAF 218tv and Almarsad remain the most-interacted-with outlets, but there are prominent examples of criticism of Haftar in the comments. In contrast, there are extremely limited instances of sympathy for the GNA or Sarraj, which are almost entirely discussed as being corrupt and incompetent.



Interest in elections and the constitution has remained low when seen through the lens of digital media outlets and published articles, but wider public Facebook discussion is at its highest level since prior to the LAAF siege of Tripoli in April 2019. Local elections, held at the end of August (and into September, outside the scope of this reporting period), had a clear impact. However, the prevalence of pro-Saif al-Islam Gaddafi content and the engagements' success of the National Conference for the Activation of the Independence Constitution and the Restoration of the Constitutional Monarchy of Libya underlines that there are very different visions for Libya's future. Moreover, the resurgence of pages linked to Russia-backed information operations, particularly Jamahiriya TV, and the identification of a potential campaign from these pages draws further attention to the influence of foreign actors in Libyan online public spaces. This highlights the potential for inauthentic online activity to manipulate both the audiences in those spaces and our impressions of the discussions occurring within them.



Interest in the United Nations (UN) and UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has significantly reduced since the resignation of Ghassan Salame from his role as UN special envoy. He remains the subject of the most-interacted-with posts and articles despite his drastically reduced presence in the news cycle. Also consistent is the decidedly negative attitude towards the UN among social media users, with the widely expressed view that the UN is the cause of many of Libya's ills and repeated accusations of bias by supporters of both sides of the conflict. However, content engaging with the UN from a less political and more humanitarian angle has surfaced among the most-engaged-with Facebook posts. The responses to these posts were, however, largely cynical and pessimistic, suggesting that there is still much work to be done to build trust and understanding between the UN and the Libyan social media audience.



Covid-19 remains far and away the most-engaged-with topic in Libyan public online spaces, continuing to reinforce the observation that topics are prioritised according to their perceived immediate relevancy to the wellbeing and safety of ordinary Libyans. The most-engaged-with stories within the topic continue to be multifaceted, crossing between international relations, health, entertainment and human interest. The drive towards contrasting positive pieces and scare stories from 218tv largely subsided throughout the first half of the reporting period, leaving behind an empathetic audience in Libyan online spaces that is keen to follow and promote the reality of the pandemic. There remain individual instances of high-interaction misinformation (and the potential for prolific mid- and low-level interaction misinformation), but covid-19 discourse in Libyan online spaces appears to have somewhat reoriented away from frivolous or misleading content. The public online sphere would appear now to have the potential to be a more effective information-sharing space although conspiracy theories remain prevalent. They range from allegations of malicious creation and weaponisation of the virus by the GNA, Turkey or the US, to 5G fearmongering and anti-Semitism.

INTRODUCTION

The following report analyses Libyan social media activity between May and August 2020 across the four categories of:

Security and Conflict
Elections and the Constitution
UN
Covid-19

Using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research, it evaluates the prominent themes in online discussion relating to these four categories and the key voices that propagate them. This is done using a base list of 33 Arabic language, Libya-focused publications, in addition to all .ly domains, and 86 international, national and local Facebook pages using the same criteria.

The methodology used can be found at the end of the report.

As the world attempted to adapt to life during the covid-19 pandemic and the year-long siege of Tripoli came to an end, discourse within Libyan online spaces continued to reflect the immediate priorities of the Libyan population. Covid-19 remains the most-engaged-with topic across the reporting period, while security and conflict also continues to be widely discussed. Both topics achieved smaller levels of engagement than in the previous reporting period; this is likely a reflection of the momentous events of the previous period (the Turkish military intervention and the start of the pandemic), especially given that these topics' engagement levels peaked in January and March, respectively, rather than a broader loss of interest. Elections and the constitution on the contrary experienced a rise in engagement levels among broader public Facebook activity to the highest level since before the siege of Tripoli in April 2019, despite interactions with articles remaining extremely low. While a significant factor in this is the local elections held at the end of August, and the monthly breakdown of engagements supports this, there is also the significant likelihood of inauthentic activity playing a role due to the increased presence of outlets linked to Russian information operations in Libya. The UN saw a significant drop in overall engagement, of which most, if not all, can be attributed to the absence of Ghassan Salame from the public sphere, as evidenced by his continued presence among the most-engaged-with article of the reporting period.




Figure 1.



SECURITY AND CONFLICT

Security and Conflict is defined as news relating to military activity, threats to civic order and the safety of civilians, and potential or realised violence. This can include ceasefire negotiations, direct military attacks or intervention, and the behaviour or statements of armed groups.

Across the reporting period of 1 May to 31 August 2020, 2,935 articles were published on the topic of security and conflict, earning 2,772,908 engagements at an average of 944 per article. This is a drop of 13% for the number of articles and 25% for the number of engagements, as well as 13% in the average engagements per article, in comparison with the previous reporting period. This likely reflects the lack of a shift event as impactful as the Turkish military intervention in January; however, the article and engagements count still remains high. May was the peak, with 882 articles and 819,411 engagements, while July dipped to 594 articles and 463,647 engagements, the lowest monthly figures of the reporting period.

The most-engaged-with article came from 218tv on 2 June, with a report detailing the arrival of Turkish tanks to Misrata that earned 33,000 engagements. Comments in response to the most-interacted-with Facebook post to share the article are highly polarised, with an even split between those that are pro-GNA and pro-LAAF. Pro-Haftar users greet the news with a mixture of defiant bravado and fears for the humanitarian situation on the ground during a GNA offensive. Pro-Sarraj comments are mostly celebratory but a few express impatience that GNA forces should be “striking, not observing”. There is very little nuance.

Three of the top ten most-engaged-with articles reported on Turkey’s involvement in the conflict, with a report claiming that Ankara had sent a guided missile frigate to the coast off Sirte to help cement GNA control over the city earning 24,800 engagements, and an article claiming that Sarraj had been holding secret talks with the Turkish Minister of Defence and Head of Intelligence earning 23,000 engagements. These articles ranked fourth and seventh for the reporting period respectively, and both were published in early June, accounting for 29% of the total engagements for the top ten most-engaged-with articles. Another prominent topic is unsurprisingly Khalifa Haftar, with two articles discussing his role in a theoretical settlement to the conflict and two discussing his relationships with and the role of foreign powers.

An article published on 31 May detailing an AFRICOM report that Haftar is being supplied with hundreds of millions or even billions of forged dinars by Russia earned 31,500 interactions. While it may seem counter-intuitive for 218tv to have published such an article given its underlying inclinations to support of the LAAF, there is precedent for pro-Haftar actors to promote and even exaggerate cooperation with Russian forces. There may also have been incentive to emphasise that the UAE are not alone as an international actor violating the UN arms embargo to supply the LAAF, given the emphasis on military equipment in the latter half of the article. The majority of responses on Facebook are in support of Haftar, but less overwhelmingly so than for some other examples. Most of these comments are flowery eulogies to Haftar but some also address the substance of the story, with a handful arguing that it is none of AFRICOM’s business and others welcoming Russian largesse. There are a small number of anti-LAAF and Haftar comments, but these are largely generic and make no reference to the substance of the article.

A report featuring comment from the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu that accuses France of hypocrisy for supporting Haftar’s “coup” earned 22,400 interactions. These articles ranked second and ninth among the most-interacted-with articles. Meanwhile, the announcement of the Cairo Initiative by Haftar, speaker of the Tobruk parliament Aguila Saleh and Egyptian president Sisi was the subject of a 218tv article that earned 28,400 interactions and ranked third for the reporting period. Less than a third of the responses on the 218tv Facebook page welcome the news, and only a minority of those explicitly display allegiance to Haftar. A significant majority are negative, with the most widespread sentiment being that when his forces had the upper hand on the battlefield, Haftar spurned every offer of peace, with continued destruction as a result, but now that he is suffering, he is seeking a deal. Some also remark that the initiative is too one-sided, coming as it does from one of Haftar’s main backers, and argue that any settlement needs the involvement of all parties to the conflict, both internally and externally.

The final Haftar-related article in the top ten detailed the various actors involved in forging a path towards a solution to the conflict, but led with the claim that the Tripoli government is aiming to exclude Haftar from all discussions and settlements. This earned 22,900 interactions. A small number of responses on the 218tv Facebook page are positive and agree that Haftar has no place in any deal because of the destruction wrought by his forces. However, most comments are negative and are dominated by two overlapping lines of argument: that the Tripoli deputies lack legitimacy and have no right to set any conditions, and that any deal that excludes one of the major parties to the conflict stands no chance of succeeding. A few posts warn that the people of eastern Libya would never accept such a settlement and would react unilaterally, presumably either via military action and/or secession.



Figure 2.

Spikes in both articles published and engagements in week 6 (commencing 1 June) and week 18 (commencing 24 August):



Figure 3.

Week	Top Article	English
Week 6	الجيش يرصد وصول شحنة دبابات تركية لمصراتة	Army observes arrival of shipment of Turkish tanks to Misrata
Week 18	السراج يلجأ لتعديل وزاري.. ويلوِّح بـ"قانون الطوارئ"	Sarraj resorts to ministerial reshuffle and raises prospect of emergency law

Figure 4.

The leap seen in week 6 is spearheaded by the aforementioned article about Turkish tanks arriving in Misrata that was the most-engaged-with article of the reporting period. In total, three of the top ten for the entire period were published in this week, accounting for 84,400 engagements or 23% of the total for the week. These articles detailed Haftar’s acceptance of the Cairo Initiative and Sarraj’s alleged secret talks with Turkey, arriving in tandem with a diplomatic push for restarting negotiations between the GNA and LAAF. Given that these were all published by the Emirati-funded 218tv, there may have been a deliberate effort to promote Haftar as reconciliatory and Sarraj as conspiring with the aggressor Turkey. This contrasts with the same outlet’s framing of Haftar’s foreign support as evidence that he is internationally well-connected and a powerful leader.

The leap in engagements in week 18 is attributable to a flood of content about Sarraj during anti-corruption protests that erupted in Tripoli and Misrata, among other parts of western Libya. The top article for the week detailed Sarraj’s address in response to the protests, in which he announced plans for a cabinet reshuffle; this earned 16,200 interactions. The responses on Facebook are overwhelmingly scathing, with Sarraj’s mention of property damage provoking particular ire. Some comments accuse him of putting property over lives, while others make the claim that Sarraj and his colleagues have caused the most destruction to Libyan property over the last few years. There were also a small number of angry posts criticising the use of live rounds against protesters. Addressing Sarraj’s broader point regarding governmental change, the general tone of response is that Sarraj is out of touch talking about topics such as cabinet reshuffles when what concerns Libyans are things like bread, electricity and water.

The remainder of the top ten for the week all reported on Sarraj’s announcement and actions in response to the protests and accusations of corruption within the GNA, either as factual reporting (6,400 engagements) or editorial criticism (6,600 engagements). The former received an almost universally scathing response on Facebook, with most users shocked, and some darkly amused, that Sarraj could have the effrontery to make such a pledge, when in their eyes he himself is deeply implicated in corruption. For the latter, commenting on the proposed cabinet reshuffle, the majority of responses are dismissive of the whole story, with many saying that the government in its entirety should be swept from power. Some users maintain that no Libyan government, even if it were sincere and honest, can rule the country because it is now dominated by foreign powers, while a small handful voice support for Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha and regard him as the most able member of the cabinet.

In line with previous reporting, 218tv and Almarsad dominate security and conflict discourse:




Figure 5.

Removing 218tv from the data reveals a mostly similar pattern across the reporting period, aside from an additional engagement spike in week 11 (commencing 6 July):




Figure 6.

This is due to a wave of anti-Turkey content from Almarsad, possibly provoked by the escalation of tensions both in Misrata between the GNA, LAAF and their foreign backers, and between Turkey and France over their involvement in Libya and security concerns in the Mediterranean, as Ankara doubled down on its support of the GNA. An example is this article in which Haftar is quoted as saying that “Turkey sees Libya as its historical legacy”; it earned 2,800 engagements and received responses on Facebook roughly two-to-one in Haftar’s favour, many of them making fulsome praise of Haftar and a few predicting a crushing defeat for Turkish forces in the country. Of the negative comments, some point out that Haftar is also supported by foreign forces on the ground in Libya, while others condemn his human rights record during the recent conflict.

The chart below shows the top 10 Facebook pages posting content related to security and conflict issues, ranked by total interactions:

Page Name	Total Interactions	Interaction Rate	Total Posts	Video Views	Post Performance	Page Likes
Libya Alahrar TV - قناة ليبيا الأحرار	2.81M	0.1%	1,523	13.11M	1.3x	1.85M
صحيفة المرصد الليبية	2.43M	0.25%	1,071	3.10M	1.1x	908,241
عاجل ارض الشريف الاخبارية	991,446	0.41%	584	555,079	1.1x	408,995
عملية بركان الغضب	811,455	0.49%	480	1.21M	1.2x	344,049
شبكة الرائد الإعلامية	705,607	0.04%	1,335	1.79M	1.5x	1.29M
Libya 24 - ليبيا 24	631,496	0.07%	1,244	400,607	1.0x	721,589
اخبار المدن الليبية	614,090	0.3%	547	327,665	-1.2x	368,686
عين ليبيا	544,811	0.03%	820	159,906	1.3x	2.26M
اخبار ليبيا	539,199	0.02%	3,103	19,524	-1.1x	1.03M
عاجل طرابلس الحدث	423,397	0.58%	349	5,177	-1.4x	208,192

Figure 7.

The overall volume of engagements slightly declines but is largely comparable to the previous reporting period, with the total of 10,491,701 engagements at 90% of the previous total of 11,684,791. Libya Alahrar TV and Almarsad again top the rankings, while six of the remaining eight pages ranked similarly to the previous reporting period. Once again, Facebook provides a more diverse set of prominent voices in comparison with digital media outlets, especially considering the consistently high performance across the top ten most-engaged-with pages, with nine of ten earning over 500,000 engagements.

High-engagement discourse is driven by similar topics to the ones discussed above. This post from the pro-Haftar Libya Alhadath was the most interacted-with across the entire reporting period, earning 102,016 interactions and 1,850,000 views:



The post shared footage of the press conference in which Haftar, Sisi and Aguila Saleh announced the Cairo Initiative. This press conference took place after the withdrawal of the LAAF from Tripoli in an attempt to propose a new political initiative to solve the Libyan crisis and political deadlock. As is expected for Haftar-related posts, the comments descend into partisan, sloganeering mudslinging. Less typically, anti-Haftar posts outnumber pro-Haftar ones two to one. Many of the anti-Haftar comments simply state “Volcano of Rage”, the name of the GNA operation to repel Haftar from western Libya. Haftar’s alleged war crimes are also cited by a few users, while he is also mocked for seeking a peace deal now that the military tide has turned against him. The majority of the pro-Haftar responses are expressions of fulsome praise for the leader.

The most dominant theme was the anti-corruption protests in August. The protests were organised through a Facebook group “23/8 Movement” which called for nationwide protests against the GNA in light of the poor living conditions in various Libyan cities. This post from Libya Alahrar TV, sharing Sarraj’s 24 August address in response to the protests, earned 52,636 interactions and 423,600 views, making it the second most-interacted-with post of the reporting period:




In his statement, Sarraj proposed numerous measures in an attempt to absorb public anger. Again, any mention of one of the heads of the two main warring blocs in Libya provokes a polarised response but, in this case and given the circumstances in which the statement was published, it is slightly more nuanced. Negative comments, of which there are twice as many as positive ones, are not simply pro-Haftar but largely take issue with what they perceive to be Sarraj’s years of misrule, marked by conflict, corruption and state dysfunction. Even pro-Sarraj sentiment is mostly of the benefit-of-the-doubt variety, rather than lavish protestations of loyalty and praise. A handful of supportive voices express frustration at Sarraj for being too lenient on his military enemies.

This Almarsad post was the third most interacted-with and shares a video of a young Libyan angrily responding to Sarraj’s address, earning 45,694 engagements and 685,400 views:



The complaints he makes about Sarraj are similar to those made in the previous thread: that Sarraj has presided over war, corruption and misgovernance. Comments on his video are overwhelmingly enthusiastic. It seems likely that critiques of Sarraj’s rulership are more resonant among some Libyan social media users when made by a private individual and are free of any pro-Haftar bias. Indeed, a small number of posts also praise the video for taking aim at Haftar as well as Sarraj.

Three of the top five most-engaged posts came from Almarsad, including one sharing Sarraj’s speech, which earned 37,694 interactions and 303,000 views, and another, seen below, akin to the video of the young man above, which depicts an exasperated and angry woman responding to unrest surrounding the recent demonstrations and the general state of Libya:



The woman previously appeared in a video during the protests where she spoke from Martyrs Square in Tripoli against the corruption in the GNA and asked for better living conditions. She starts this latest video by summarising the abuse she experienced as a result of her previous video where people called her a “whore” who “was taught in Abu Dhabi” (insinuating her support to UAE-backed Haftar) and accuse her of being supported by a “big head”. However, she blames both Sarraj and Haftar for this situation, as well as the various outside forces who back them. She also makes another highly emotive point among many Libyans, namely that while the vast majority of the country’s populace are struggling, the families of the elites are living in comfort and security, many of them abroad. The responses are even more favourable than above, perhaps due in part to the speaker’s apparent vulnerability as well as to the fact that she broadened her attack to include all the influential powers in Libya, rather than focusing just on Libyan actors and institutions. However, a handful of pro-Haftar users did object to her comparing Haftar to Sarraj.

This post earned 26,137 engagements and 288,700 views; Almarsad’s pro-Haftar voice has clearly had significant influence on the most widely distributed and consumed information regarding the August protests as it supported their case against the GNA.

Security and conflict discourse on Twitter has, conversely to digital media outlets and Facebook discussion, seen an increase since the previous reporting period, with 315,000 tweets at an average of 2,580 per day. This is an increase of 15% and 12%, respectively. The top ten most-interacted-with tweets come exclusively from two accounts: @EbrahimGasuda and @emad_badish. Gasuda's Twiter biography states that he is a Libyan writer and political activist and he has regularly produced some of the most-engaged-with tweets on political and security developments in Libya; the speed with which some of his posts garner interactions suggests that the account is likely amplified by inauthentic activity. Badish's biography describes him as a political activist. Both of them tweet impassioned updates regarding recent developments in the security situation and state of the conflict along with their personal reactions, such as the below examples that received 7,357 and 5,123 engagements, respectively:



Twitter activity shared the large spike in volume seen around the Cairo Initiative conference on 6 June, clearly suggesting it as one of the key events of security and conflict discourse over the reporting period. There were 10,200 engagements across the day, up 38% on the previous day and a 395% increase on the average daily figure. This was in fact primarily not driven by the Cairo Initiative, although it did feature, but events in Misrata as the Al-Watiya airbase was hit by airstrikes thought to be from a foreign air force aligned with the LAAF.




Figure 8.

Many of the most-engaged-with tweets noted and remembered those that were killed in the strikes, such as the two examples below:



These earned 202 and 322 engagements, respectively.

Overall, it is clear that foreign interference, in particular from Turkey, is a major driver of security and conflict discourse in Libyan online spaces. A major factor in this is the continued dominance of pro-LAAF voices in the media, in particular Almarsad and 218tv. The Cairo Initiative and fighting in Misrata drove engagements in the first half of the reporting period, while the emergence of popular demonstration against corruption in the GNA and Sarraj's response to this challenge were the key topics of the second half.

It is notable that the 22 August announcement of a ceasefire received little to no coverage or engagement among the most influential voices. This could be reflective of a desire to avoid any portrayal of Sarraj as conciliatory among outlets sympathetic to the LAAF and a lack of appetite for an end to hostilities among pro-Haftar actors. Additionally, the lack of engagement perhaps suggests an awareness among the Libyan online population of the GNA's muted ability to enforce a ceasefire, dampening any perception of its significance.

Security and conflict remains a high-engagement sphere of discussion that has seen mild dips during less eventful periods but nevertheless maintains strong interest. The changes in the most-prevalent type of interaction that were observed in the previous reporting period still stand here: the previous bulletin-like updates on local violence have almost entirely subsided, and debate over foreign interference, the conflict itself and the stability of Libyan society is what now drives activity online.

ELECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION

Elections and the Constitution is defined as news relating to the electoral behaviour of political leaders; parties and institutions; the Libyan democratic process; and the status of constitutional reform. This includes references to judicial elections and referenda.

Between 1 May and 31 August 2020, 104 articles were published that touched upon the subjects of elections or the constitution. These generated 22,275 engagements at an average of 214 per article. This represents a sharp jump in quantity of articles in comparison with the previous reporting period's 39 articles, but the fairly similar number of engagements (21,603) means that the average per article has taken a significant hit, down 61% from 553. The month-by-month view of total articles against total Facebook engagements shows that this activity is heavily weighted towards August, which saw 54 articles and 13,180 engagements, and to a lesser extent July, for which there were 22 articles published that received a total of 7,955 engagements.




Figure 9.

However, a week-by-week view shows that two weeks in particular generated the majority of the interactions in both August and July. A 218tv article published on 15 July (week 12) earned 5,500 interactions, 69% of the total for the month and was the most interacted-with article of the reporting period for the topic. The article detailed the comments of Nadia Omran, a member of the Constituent Drafting Assembly, in which she stressed the need to refocus and de-politicise the process of drafting a new constitution as far as possible, because extraneous initiatives are restraining the Assembly's ability to make progress. She asserted that an excess of both international and regional political voices distracted from the core goal of the Assembly and the purpose of a new constitution and referendum: to allow the people of Libya to collectively shape their own destiny. Comments in response to the most-interacted-with Facebook post to share the article are overwhelmingly negative, with a number of users mocking the idea that Libya is governed constitutionally at a time of state collapse, war and foreign occupation. Some posts argue that Libyans are more concerned with security and economic well-being than political wrangling, while a small number call for the return of a dictatorship. Others discuss the idea of a constitution but claim that the proposed draft will not deliver a safe, free and democratic Libya. A more specific objection raised by a handful of users is that this constitution bears the imprint of the Muslim Brotherhood. A couple of responses pour scorn on 218tv for publishing the article.

A second 218tv article published on 25 August (week 18) earned 4,600 engagements, 35% of the total for the month and making it the top interacted-with article for August. The article reported on the attack of a polling station in Traghan in the Murzuq desert of southwest Libya by an armed group affiliated with the LAAF, leading with UNSMIL's condemnation. A majority of comments in response slam the development, with some observing that it is typical of the "dictator" Haftar. A small number of posts attack the credibility of UNSMIL or claim that the people of Tripoli are more interested in toppling the GNA than elections.




Figure 10.

Week	Top Article	English
Week 7	السايج يؤكد للسراج جاهزية المفوضية لتنظيم انتخابات في أي وقت	Sayeh confirms that Sarraj is ready for a commission to arrange elections at any time
Week 12	مطالبات بعدم تجاوز أي مبادرة سياسية لمشروع الدستور	Demands not to overstep any political initiative of the constitution project
Week 18	البعثة: مجموعة مسلحة تابعة للجيش الوطني عطلت انتخابات تراغن	The UN Mission: an armed group affiliated to the National Army delayed elections in Taraghin

Figure 11.

The peak seen in week 7 highlights the only other article to cross 1,000 interactions, a 218tv piece noting a high-profile meeting between GNA Prime Minister Sarraj and the head of the High National Elections Commission Imad al-Sayeh, during which they discussed the technical, financial and administrative hurdles that must be solved in order for Libya to hold elections that meet international standards. The article earned 1,400 engagements. The vast majority of responses analysed are negative, many cynically so, stating that any election that takes place will be a cosmetic, irrelevant exercise given the current state of the country. A number of users argue that Libya needs real change, such as a peace process, economic security, freedom and democracy, before any meaningful vote can be held. Some comments also dismiss the election as a ploy by the GNA to retain its hold on power, with a few accusing Sayeh of being its willing stooge. There is a small number of positive responses, which seem to welcome the prospect of an election, but none of these posts declares any partisan allegiance. Twelve of the top 20 articles across the reporting period detailed either logistical challenges or violence in relation to holding municipal, constitutional or presidential elections in Libya. This, combined with the fact that 59% of engagements for the reporting period came in August along with the start of the municipal election cycle across 38 municipalities on 18 August, suggests that there remains potential to provoke greater interest and engagement in elections and the constitution across Libyan online spaces. Numbers remain low, but the increase in content generated around the municipal election was distinct and brought a marked increase in engagements with it. This demonstrates that the Libyan online community is at least to some degree responsive to electoral and constitutional developments.

Once again, the share of engagements is heavily weighted towards 218tv, which earned 70% of the overall number for the reporting period with 15,500. Ean Liya and Libya Akhbar comfortably dominate the remaining outlets, with 26% of the total engagements between them.




Figure 12.

The chart below shows the top 10 Facebook pages posting content related to elections or the constitution, ranked by total interactions:

Page Name	Total Interactions	Interaction Rate	Total Posts	Video Views	Post Performance	Page Likes
Libya 24 - ليبيا 24	42,922	0.1%	57	41,116	2.1x	720,863
صحيفة المرصد الليبية	42,100	0.21%	22	30,073	-1.1x	905,194
قناة الجماهيرية - aljamaheeria tv	41,048	0.02%	162	64,381	2.1x	1.12M
Libya Alahrar TV - قناة ليبيا الأحرار	36,838	0.06%	33	59,527	-1.2x	1.84M
وكالة الجماهيرية للأنباء "أوج"	33,877	0.21%	110	—	1.3x	145,099
المؤتمر الوطني لتفعيل دستور الإستقلال وعودة الملكية الدستورية لليبية	20,484	18.86%	4	—	32.7x	27,159
شبكة الرائد الإعلامية	16,676	0.04%	31	20,251	1.6x	1.29M
اللجنة المركزية لانتخابات المجالس البلدية	14,414	0.64%	24	—	3.5x	94,480
اخبار ليبيا	14,118	0.01%	102	—	-1.3x	1.03M
اخبار المدن الليبية	9,809	0.22%	12	12,925	1.2x	366,418

Figure 13.

As in the previous reporting period, engagements across the wider realm of public Facebook pages and groups are significantly higher. Even in comparison to the previous period there is a lot of activity, with 272,286 engagements versus 113,035. Of note is the strong performance of Russia-backed and pro-Gaddafi (Muamar and Saif al-Islam) Jamahiriya TV and Jana News Agency, which generated 74,925 engagements collectively and ranked third and fifth, respectively, and neither of which ranked in the top 10 previously. The Russia-linked Libya 24 topped the ranking by total interactions, with 42,922, meaning that at least 43% of the total interactions of the top ten most-interacted-with pages come from pages connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin's Libya operation. There is accordingly a heavy presence of pro-Gaddafi content among the most-interacted-with posts. One example is the below post from Libya 24 promoting claims from an Italian news agency that Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is the best choice to lead Libya, despite the claim originating from a Libyan source close to Gaddafi:



Pro-Gaddafi sentiment in the comments outnumbered anti-Gaddafi two to one but the story itself received an even split between positive and negative reactions. Some pro-Saif comments distrust the motives behind making such a suggestion and suspect it is part of a nefarious plot to discredit Gaddafi and his followers. Other comments reject the idea, either because of the implied foreign interference in Libya's affairs or because a new Gaddafi in power would be a step backwards.

Plenty of Gaddafi coverage came from pages other than those linked with Russian information operations, such as this post from the Benghazi-based Libyan Address Journal that speculates as to whether Gaddafi is even alive:



It was the third most-interacted-with post of the reporting period, earning 7,295 engagements. Two-thirds of the coded responses are from Gaddafi supporters, most of whom condemn the claim as an enemy lie. However, a small number of pro-Saif users seem to resign themselves to the fact that he is probably dead. Some ambivalent comments also believe that Saif is dead and, after wishing for mercy on his soul, call for the country to move on beyond the past. Other, more outwardly anti-Gaddafi posts welcome the idea that Saif is dead, with some mocking his supporters for clinging to the idea that he is alive and remains a great political hope for them.

Not all of the posts from Russia-linked pages concerned Gaddafi. The below post from Jamahiriya TV claims to have received information from a source within the Constituent Drafting Assembly of Libya that claims Khalifa Haftar is set to be given complete executive power along with the abolition of all other legislative or executive entities:



Unlike many other Haftar-related posts, pro-Haftar voices while in the majority do not overwhelm other perspectives. The main objection of his supporters is that this news story is a lie, with some posts attacking Jamahiriya TV's bias. Anti-Haftar comments mock his supporters for embracing a return to dictatorship, with some asking why "the loser" (referring to the siege of Tripoli) is gaining so much power in the settlement.

The post received 3,956 engagements and is a clear example of inflammatory and aggravating disinformation. The post also contains the hashtag [#قناة_الجمهورية_العظمى_قناة_كل_الجماهير](#) (The Great Jamahiriya Channel, Channel of All Masses), which was used 4,366 times across the reporting period and received a total of 820,529 interactions. The 813,015 of these interactions came before 11 July 11:




Figure 14.

Jamahiriya TV is the former Libyan National Television broadcaster that ceased transmission after "the seizure of its studios by the forces of the National Transitional Council of Libya". It had re-emerged by 2014 via a communication satellite owned by a company called Nilesat, based in Cairo, but broadcast erratically and would often go entirely dark for two to three months. Since at least January 2019, an organisation known as "The Company" has been supplying personnel who have "carried out technical re-equipment of the channels television studios and paid off debts to staff and satellite providers". It has been training staff, funding and producing regular news broadcasts and new programming, and developing a network of correspondents across Libya. A "unified information service" was created by these specialists to better coordinate between Jamahiriya TV and Jana News Agency. These individuals and The Company are confirmed to be a part of Yevgeny Prigozhin's operations in Libya, which develop and leverage Russian state influence through the use of political consultants and front organisations, in addition to information operations.

All interactions and uses of the hashtag originate solely from the Jamahiriya TV page, demonstrating both the possible reach of the page and the potential that the hashtag was part of a campaign to grow the audience of Jamahiriya TV and spread the narratives it was promoting. It is worth noting the extremely high level of interactions generated by the page and Russia's history of coordinated inauthentic social media activity; this is a sign of a possible information operations campaign and at the very least a sharp and sudden jump in Jamahiriya TV's activity in comparison with recent months. A wider view of the hashtags use since the beginning of 2020 further evidences this idea:



Figure 15.

The two most-engaged-with posts of the reporting period on the topic of elections and the constitution came from the National Conference for the Activation of the Independence Constitution and the Restoration of the Constitutional Monarchy of Libya, which both advocate for a return to the post-independence, pre-Gaddafi hereditary monarchy. This was the top post of the period:



Just over half of the coded comments reject the idea, with the most common objection being that such a development would be regressive and undemocratic and, more trenchantly, an opportunity for corruption and one-family rule. A handful of other critics claim that the Muslim Brotherhood is behind the appeal for a restored monarchy. Comments in support of the proposal are divided fairly evenly between the highly enthusiastic and the more pragmatic, with some insisting that any new monarchy be constitutionally bound by an effective parliament. In both cases, the sentiment expressed is that such a new system might create a united, stable, functioning, independent and self-respecting state. Others dismiss this as a fantasy, with several users arguing that a return to the 1963 constitution, which made Libya a more coherent and democratically accountable polity, provides a superior historical model.

Both of the posts encouraged Libyans to register to join the organisation as a member and to be a part of its campaign advocating for a return to constitutional monarchy. The posts suggest a ramping up of their activity in the coming weeks and months, earning 11,572 and 8,155 engagements each.

It is worth noting that despite very high total engagement figures, 11,572 is a relatively low figure for the most-interacted-with post, and this is reflected across the other top posts of the reporting period. It appears that, rather than particular posts, events or stories creating a lot of interest, the core audiences of these pages are extremely engaged and interactive with their content. The significant rise in total engagements has been driven by an overall growth of interest, rather than a handful of eye-catching or controversial posts drawing a massive amount of attention individually.

Twitter activity has seen much the same jump as Facebook, with 9,710 mentions at an average of 80 per day, in comparison with 3,915 at an average of 33 per day across the previous reporting period.




Figure 16.

Two clear spikes in activity are evident. The first leap came on 24 June and was clearly in response to the comments of Head of the High Council of State Khalid al-Mishri rejecting the Tunisian president's assessment that Libya should model its political stabilisation on Afghanistan and in consultation with the tribes.

Many responses expressed exasperation at continued foreign interference in Libya's political situation:



Others simply spread al-Mishri's comments:



The second spike of activity came on 21 August, largely in response to Fayez al-Sarraj's declaration that presidential and parliamentary elections should be held in March 2021. This is demonstrated by the following two tweets, the first of which responds with a comment of exasperation and relief that there may be a path to a more stable Libya:



The second tweet shares the declaration itself:



Overall, conversation in Libyan online spaces regarding elections and the constitution has been somewhat reinvigorated by the tangible developments of recent months. The gains are extremely modest, and it remains to be seen whether or not declarations and promises will bear fruit, but nevertheless there is greater interest in these topics in digital spaces than at any time since prior to the siege of Tripoli in April 2019. The significant influence of Russia-backed pages is of concern, and the prevalence of Saif al-Islam-related content from beyond these pages suggests that prior campaigns from Russian sources have been at least somewhat effective. The potentially misleading effects of inauthentic behaviour also loom large over analysis of this activity. Moreover, the top-ranking performance of posts from the National Conference for the Activation of the Independence Constitution and the Restoration of the Constitutional Monarchy of Libya underlines that there are very different visions for Libya's future among Libyans themselves. It is nonetheless positive to see the growth of engagement and activity as evidence of remaining potential to be galvanised into civic participation among the Libyan online population, when it would be eminently feasible for apathy and pessimism to persevere.



The UN is defined as news relating to the activity of United Nations representatives or at UN summits with regards to Libya. This includes activity related to the UN-backed peace process and contact between UNSMIL and the GNA or LAAF.

217 articles were published on the topic of the UN in the Libyan digital media across the reporting period, earning 131,283 engagements at an average of 604 per article. This is a marked drop from the previous period, in which 735 articles were published, receiving 589,125 engagements at an average of 801 per article. This continues the descending pattern seen in the second half of the previous period, as interest in the UN dwindled in the face of the covid-19 outbreak and Ghassan Salame's resignation from UNSMIL. The most-engaged-with article of the current reporting period is from 218tv and detailed a UN statement that transformation in the military situation in Libya over recent weeks perhaps presented an opportunity to push forward with peace negotiations, earning 9,800 interactions. Any mention of the UN seems to provoke heated reactions from Libyan social media users and this case is no exception. Responses to the most-interacted-with Facebook post to share the article are almost uniformly negative, many scathingly so, especially those from an explicitly pro-GNA or anti-LAAF perspective. Among such posts, many accuse the UN of siding with Haftar against the GNA and claim that it is only now calling for talks in order to stall the recent momentum of the GNA forces. More broadly, other posts argue that it is the UN that brought such destruction to Libya in the first place and saying the situation in the country is too far gone for any negotiated settlement. A handful of users welcome the idea of an international peace-keeping force in Libya without the UN's involvement.

Four of the top ten most-interacted-with articles detailed similar UN statements regarding military activity in Libya, earning 29,200 interactions and 22% of the overall total. A further three of the top ten refer to Ghassan Salame, with two reporting on the search for his successor at UNSMIL and one detailing his return to the board of International Crisis Group following his resignation. These earned a combined 21,900 interactions and 17% of the overall total. The first of the three received a torrent of anti-Salame comments on the 218tv Facebook page, with users even wishing COVID-19 or cancer upon him. Salame is variously accused of wishing destruction upon Libya, of stealing the country's wealth and of taking sides in the civil war. The second received a handful of comments that recognised the difficulty of the UN's task, but some maintained that the situation is worsened by its involvement. Mostly, however, the comments were dominated by anti-UN rhetoric; a significant number of comments allege that it was the UN that brought ruin to Libya and reject the idea of a replacement envoy, who they believe will only continue to serve the UN's alleged agenda in the country. A few comments are more positive, but even these offer only qualified approval such as by insisting that Libyans are more actively involved in UN decision-making in its affairs, or that any new envoy should be African or Asian, not from the West or the Arab World. The third also received its fair share of anti-Salame vitriol, although not as overwhelming as other examples. The majority of comments do not directly address his new appointment but dwell on Libyan issues. Negative comments again accuse Salame of being instrumental in an international plan to destroy Libya, as well as personally financially profiting from the country's misery. Those negative posts that do reference Salame's new post are indignant that, in their opinion, he is being rewarded for failure, while a number are amused that he recovered so quickly from the ill health that he cited when resigning from his UNSMIL role. Positive comments counter that Salame deserves his appointment, with some saying that he tried his best in Libya, but his job was made impossible by the intransigence of Libyans themselves.

While the appointment of a new head of UNSMIL is major news, the relative high profile of Salame's personal next career steps suggests that he as an individual is still drawing a significant chunk of UN-related engagements. This underlines how significant the character of Ghassan Salame has been to UN-related conversation in Libyan online spaces, and 218v in particular. All of these articles were published by 218tv, and if it is removed from the dataset none of the remaining top ten most-engaged-with articles feature Salame at all; 218tv appears to have pushed to maintain Salame's high profile as a controversial and divisive figure, and the framing of his new role as a return to politics could be considered misleading or inflammatory as the International Crisis Group is an advisory organisation and not a political body or institution.




Figure 17.

Eight of the ten most-engaged-with articles were published in May and June, amid the rapid decline in interest in UN discourse. As seen in the graph below, three of the four weekly spikes came during this period:




Figure 18.

Week	Top Article	English
Week 3	الأمم المتحدة: اختيار مبعوث إلى ليبيا "عملية معقدة"	UN: Choosing an envoy to Libya is a "complicated matter"
Week 6	الأمم المتحدة: التطورات العسكرية في ليبيا فرصة للدفع بالمفاوضات	UN: Military developments in Libya are an opportunity to push negotiations forward
Week 10	الأمم المتحدة: الألغام توقع 130 ضحية جنوب طرابلس	UN: Mines claim 130 victims south of Tripoli
Week 18	الأمم المتحدة: كارثة محتملة في سرت.. وليبيا "أضعف" من كورونا	UN: A likely disaster in Sirte and Libya is "too weak for Corona"

Figure 19.

These articles all appear in the top ten most interacted-with for the reporting period and all detail press conferences of statements from UNSMIL. The top article from week 10, reporting on the prolific death toll of landmines in areas south of Tripoli, earned 5,700 interactions and was responded to largely with shock and anger at the number of deaths; the typical anti-UN response is significantly diminished. The article from week 18 earned 7,900 interactions and the response from Facebook users largely arguing that the UN is the cause of Libya's current ills, having unleashed violence on the country at the behest of certain world powers. A few comments also chastise the UN for only being selectively concerned for Libya's well-being, accusing the body of ignoring longer-standing issues such as a lack of rights and collapsing infrastructure. A handful of the responses are overtly partisan, with GNA and LAAF supporters both accusing the UN of supporting the other side. This highlights that the audience remains active and has not become entirely static in the absence of Ghassan Salame. These articles earned 8,400, 9,800, 5,700 and 7,800 engagements, respectively. These articles all reflect UN statements in response to concerns that are immediately relevant in Libya; a spike in articles published in week 14 (c/ 27 July) is seemingly in response to reports of a wave criticism, either of UNSMIL or how its partners interact with it, from Germany, Egypt, Algeria and the Arab League, but this did not bring a jump in interactions with it. Even in these lower interaction weeks, the anti-UN sentiment remains strong in the comments in response to relevant articles. For example, an article published by 218tv on 13 June detailing UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres expressing his shock at the discovery of mass graves in Tarhuna and demanding the GNA investigate, having recently captured an area from the LAAF, earned 5,900 interactions; in the comments of the most-interacted-with post to share the article, there was a tirade of criticism directed at the UN, which was accused of being partial, hypocritical and dishonest and of echoing GNA propaganda.

218tv is once again the dominating voice among digital media outlets and earned 52% of the engagements across the reporting period, followed by Almarsad with 28%. Their combined 80% is a drop from the previous period's 85% but suggests that they still collectively control much of the message within UN discourse across digital media outlets. Notably, Almarsad's share of this has fallen, perhaps a reflection of 218tv's continued pursual of Ghassan Salame-related content into May and June while Almarsad published nothing directly related to the former UNSMIL special representative.




Figure 20.


The below table shows the top ten most-interacted-with pages of the reporting period on the topic of the UN:

Page Name	Total Interactions	Interaction Rate	Total Posts	Video Views	Post Performance	Page Likes
Libya Alahrar TV - قناة ليبيا الإحرار	164,325	0.07%	122	323,641	-1.2x	1.84M
صحيفة المرصد الليبية	137,772	0.22%	70	—	-1.1x	905,609
Huna Libya هنا ليبيا	58,854	0.27%	65	85,195	1.9x	337,746
ليبيا 24 - 24 Libya	58,100	0.04%	207	32,097	-1.4x	720,951
اخبار ليبيا	41,983	0.01%	351	—	-1.6x	1.03M
انا ليبي ومراتي ليبي	37,288	1.02%	2	—	1.3x	1.83M
شبكة الرائد الإعلامية	37,207	0.03%	100	20,788	1.0x	1.29M
Salam - سلام	34,419	0.17%	14	246,901	2.7x	1.42M
عين ليبيا	34,058	0.02%	90	5,669	-1.3x	2.26M
عاجل ارض الشريف الاخبارية	33,639	0.41%	20	10,698	1.2x	408,985

Figure 21.

The total of 637,645 engagements is a dramatic decline from the previous reporting period's 1,154,864, a drop of 45%. However, Almarsad's drop from 440,386 to 137,772 accounts for 59% of this. Almarsad's status as the dominant voice has been weakened by Ghassan Salame's departure, due to both the draw of divisive Salame-related content itself and the apparent reduced interest in the UN overall after his departure.

Thematically, the most-interacted-with posts are split between those that, in line with the pattern seen with published articles, focus on updates from UNSMIL, such as this from Almarsad reporting on UNSMIL's approval of the GNA delegation set to participate in 5+5 negotiations in Geneva, earning 5,749 engagements:



The great majority of responses are negative, with much of the negativity taking the form of factional boasting and mudslinging from partisan, largely pro-Haftar users. There are also a significant number of comments that react negatively to the story, some with anger and some with cynical amusement. These comments condemn all parties to the conflict for the harm they have caused Libya and cast doubt on the potential for fruitful talks because the opposing factions are either too self-interested to make compromises or are puppets of outside powers. The few positive responses nearly all express the hope that the opposing sides will put their differences aside and arrive at a peace deal.

This post, also from Almarsad, detailing UNSMIL's statement following the discovery of mass graves in Tarhuna after it was liberated from LAAF control, earned 5,490 engagements:



The responses are, in contrast to what could be expected from Almarsad but in step with the nature of the report, largely pro-GNA and mostly attack Egypt for its role in supporting the LAAF. There are a handful of anti-Turkey comments that attempt to shift the blame for atrocities in Libya away from Haftar and his backers and onto the Turkish military.

And those posts that promote more civic or humanitarian engagement with the UN, such as this post from Elkul encouraging its readers to mark UN World Youth Day by engaging with the difficult reality facing Libya's youth, which earned 4,538 interactions:



The responses are overwhelming negative, by a ratio of more than two to one of coded comments. Commenters are cynical and pessimistic, arguing that war, corruption and state failure make a mockery of promoting such a day in Libya. These sentiments are embodied in one comment that reads “their future is the Kalashnikov”. A handful of the more positive responses agree that the situation in the country is bleak but express hope that the younger generation can build a better future. Most of the positive comments are optimistic and inspirational but brief and platitudinous.

Another of Elkul's high-performing posts promoted UNSMIL's assessment of the dire humanitarian situation in Libya and earned 4,485 engagements:



Responses to the post are evenly split between positive and negative, with many of the former consisting of appeals for divine support for the country. Most negative comments heap scorn on the international community in general and the UN in particular for reducing Libya to this state in the first place. Indeed, some pro-Gaddafi posts claim that the country was in need of no outside assistance until foreign military intervention. There are also a handful of responses that express a kind of wounded pride, claiming that Libyans can solve their problems without help, or that foreign aid focuses too much on “illegal” migrants and that Libyans are more deserving of international assistance.

These posts and their comparable levels of engagement highlight that the cessation of provocative anti-Salame content has allowed an entirely different type of discourse around the UN to surface across Facebook. This content, as demonstrated by the examples from Elkul, engages with the UN in a humanitarian context removed from the highly politicised discourse typical for UN-related discussion.

Twitter activity remained very similar to the previous reporting period, with 19,798 mentions at an average of 162 per day from 4,544 different unique authors. This is in comparison with 19,300 mentions at 161 per day from 5,140 unique authors across the previous period. The most-engaged-with tweet of the current reporting period came from Ebrahim Gasuda and commented on the statements of UNSMIL and the US Embassy in Libya in response to the discovery of mass graves in Tarhuna, earning 3,353 engagements:



Gasuda produced two of the top ten most-engaged-with tweets of this reporting period, demonstrating effectiveness of the account's likely support from inauthentic engagement, which was referred to earlier. The second of these tweets commented on the previous hesitancy of UN officials to name foreign interference in Libya as such, and what he perceives as their willingness to do so after the liberation of Tripoli earlier in 2020:



The other prominent voices within UN-related discourse are those of international multilateral and diplomatic institutions. 14 of the top 30 most-interacted-with tweets came from UNSMIL, the US Embassy in Libya and the UK Embassy in Libya. The embassies discussed and highlighted concerns regarding foreign interference and security instability, referring to the UN Security Council arms embargo:





For its part, UNSMIL itself underlined a number of security issues, including the anniversary of the disappearance of Seham Sergiwa:



Despite their high ranking, none of these tweets performed notably well, earning 209, 367 and 272 engagements, respectively. The overall pattern of Twitter activity suggests that conversation around the UN on the platform has consolidated around highly engaged political discussion and has not seen the emergence of civic and humanitarian discourse that has happened on Facebook; however, the disappearance of anti-Salame content is mirrored across both platforms.

Once again Ghassan Salame casts a long shadow over UN-related discourse in Libyan online spaces, but for this reporting period it is through his absence. A modest push from 218tv in May and June to continue publishing Salame-related content was short lived and could not turn the tide against waning interest. Notably, it is the sources of the most fervent and controversial Salame content, 218tv and Almarsad, that have seen the biggest impact from his departure. The lack of sensationalised Salame smears has meant that more pragmatic and informative content has surfaced in its place, leading to a less intense but healthier discourse.



Covid-19 is defined as news relating to any aspect of the global pandemic. This includes health, politics, human-interest stories and anything else that is in some way impacted by the spread of the virus when it is explicitly linked by the content author.

The volume of covid-19-related content being produced and the accompanying level of engagement have both dropped from the March 2020 peak and the previous reporting period's total of 5,387 articles and 7,107,375 engagements. This reporting period saw 4,438 articles published generating 3,711,335 engagements at an average of 836 per article. While these figures are smaller than those previously reported, there is still evidently significant interest in covid-19-related stories as the topic elicited the highest number of engagements of all the topics covered in this report. While the number of articles published declined month-over-month, the drops of 27% from May to June and less than 1% from June to July are outmatched by the drop in average engagements per article of 35% and 57% across the same period, demonstrating that interest dropped faster than media outlets perhaps anticipated. There was a slight bump in both total articles published and engagements in August, driven primarily by the Russian government's preliminary approval of a covid-19 vaccine yet to undergo testing, which was the topic of the month's most-interacted-with article, earning 19,200 interactions. Most responses in the comments of the most-interacted-with post sharing the article are positive, with many hoping the news is true. However, there is a political factor, given Russia's support for Khalifa Haftar. A few posts claim the vaccine is evidence of Putin's great statesmanship, while others express exasperation that people are falling for Russian "propaganda".




Figure 22.

The top articles continue to focus on international developments, with stories from Italy, Egypt and the US among the top five for the reporting period. An article detailing the efforts of an Italian town to prepare outdoor teaching environments for schoolchildren earned 52,900 engagements, making it the most-interacted-with article of the entire reporting period. The great majority of responses are positive, hailing it as a great idea and in some cases contrasting it with the lack of initiative shown by the Libyan authorities; the few negative posts argue that no amount of prevention measures can thwart the fate decreed by God, with a couple of users claiming that covid-19 is a hoax.

This is followed by a story highlighting US President Donald Trump's declaration that he had begun taking hydroxychloroquine in order to stave off covid-19, which earned 40,500 engagements. Although a few responses think this is a promising treatment, the great majority of comments are highly negative, often devolving into generalised anti-Trump ranting, calling him a "liar", "mad" and "evil." Some posts even wish death upon him, either by covid-19 or other means.

The third most-interacted-with article of the reporting period provided updates on the state of the pandemic in various high-profile countries, including China, Germany and South Korea, earning 37,600 engagements. About half the responses express an understanding of the need for caution or to take the pandemic seriously, while some users again contrast Europe’s preparedness with Arab states’ alleged negligence. This then evolved into a sub-debate on the effectiveness of the stay-at-home order in Libya. Negative comments include a handful of further allegations that covid-19 is a hoax or conspiracy, as well as a few expressions of anti-European feeling, including hopes that the continent suffers even more from the pandemic.

Egypt also received significant attention within the top ten most-engaged-with articles for the reporting period. In fifth place was a report detailing the singer Yasmin Ali’s new set of songs in support of the Egyptian emergency and healthcare systems. Just over half the comments in response to the post sharing the article on the 218tv Facebook page were from supportive well-wishers, while the other responses were cynically critical of what good her songs can really achieve or took the opportunity to voice their opposition to the Egyptian government’s support of Khalifa Haftar. The article received 34,900 engagements. Interestingly, the sixth-place article reported on an Egyptian doctor who spent 65 days in isolation with her covid-19 patients and received unanimous praise in the comments under the most-interacted-with Facebook post to share the article, along with 33,300 total engagements.

All of these articles were published in May, highlighting the decline in engagements as time has passed since the beginning of the pandemic, and were published, along with the rest of the top 104 most-interacted-with articles of the reporting period, by 218tv. The UAE-funded outlet has continued to dominate covid-19 discourse in Libyan online spaces. The top article in both June and July were also published by 218tv and detailed the rising number of covid-19 infections cross Africa and President Trump’s unsubstantiated claims regarding the state of the pandemic in the US; they earned 25,500 and 15,200 engagements, respectively. The former received responses split evenly between those who gave such claims credence and those who felt that they were exaggerated, a small number of which claimed that the World Health Organization is using fear to promote its agenda. The latter provoked anger and conspiracy, with some users expressing a desire for President Trump and the United States to suffer, while others claim covid-19 to be a deliberate attempt of the US to exert global control, citing either alleged prophetic warnings of Muammar Gaddafi or anti-Semitic conspiracy theories.

A weekly perspective demonstrates both the overall trend across the reporting period and the impact of the news regarding a Russian covid-19 vaccine’s theoretical approval in week 16 (commencing 9 August):




Figure 23.

However, this perspective also draws attention to the increased attention afforded to 218tv articles explicitly criticising the GNA’s handling of the covid-19 crisis. In weeks 14, 15 and 16, the top articles, excluding those in relation to the Russian covid-19 vaccine, were all critical of the GNA’s performance. They earned 13,400, 9,700 and 16,000 engagements, respectively. This renewed focus is demonstrated further by the fact that 12 of the top 20 most-interacted-with articles in August were about the state of the pandemic within Libya’s borders, in comparison with just two in May. This pivot was met with a notable but modest jump in engagements, suggesting that this was an editorial decision rather than one driven by audience appetite. Responses on Facebook to these articles largely shared a pitiful view of the GNA, with a small but consistent segment of commenters doubting the veracity of the reporting and spreading conspiracies about the existence or extent of the pandemic.

Week	Top Article	English
Week 2	كورونا.. أوروبا تستعد لـ "التنفس بحذر" خوفا من الانتكاس	Corona: Europe prepares to "breathe carefully", fearing a relapse
Week 4	ترامب يتناول عقار هيدروكسي كلوروكين للوقاية من كورونا	Trump takes the drug hydroxychloroquine as a protection against Corona
Week 14	كورونا يجد "التهاون المثالي" لانتشاره في ليبيا	Corona finds the "ideal negligence" to spread in Libya
Week 15	أزمة كورونا في ليبيا.. صراع على الصلاحيات والموارد	Corona crisis in Libya: a struggle for capabilities and resources
Week 16	بالوثائق.. 218 تكشف فساد الحكومة الليبية تحت غطاء كورونا	Documented: 218 reveals the Libyan government's corruption under the cover of Corona
Week 16	جُربَ على ابنة بوتين.. روسيا تسجل أول لقاح ضد كورونا	Tested on Putin's daughter: Russia registers the first vaccination against Corona

Figure 24.

218tv's dominance of covid-19 discourse is clear from its position as the source of 3,100,00, or 83%, of the total engagements across the reporting period.




Figure 25.

Removing 218tv from the dataset shows a much less singularly dominated discourse between the remaining outlets, mainly Almarsad, Libya Akhbar, Ean Libya and Afrigate News.




Figure 26.

218tv's removal also demonstrates that the engagement figures in May and June that were significantly higher than the later weeks were entirely driven by 218tv content:




Figure 27.

The same spikes are present, at weeks 2-3 and week 16, but they are significantly gentler. The focus on international stories in the initial weeks of the reporting period is also absent, with the top three articles in week 2 all from Almarsad and involving criticism of Turkey for how its relationship with the GNA is affecting the pandemic in Libya. These earned a combined total of 15,200 engagements. Responses to these articles expressed considerable anger at the GNA and its cooperation with Turkey, including the consulate in Istanbul for its role in leaving dozens of Libyans stranded abroad. A handful of commenters have suggested that the GNA wants covid-19 to kill Libyans, while others accuse Turkey of being behind the pandemic. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is mocked and overwhelmingly criticised by commenters when he is mentioned. The potential for a Russian covid-19 vaccine remains the most discussed topic of week 16.

Week	Top Article	English
Week 2	فضيحة كبرى تضرب القنصلية الليبية في إسطنبول تتسبب بإلغاء عودة عشرات العالقين	Major scandal hits the Libyan consulate in Istanbul as a result of the cancelled return of dozens of stranded travellers
Week 2	التكبالي: نبشر أردوغان علاوة على الوباء والإفلاس وبداية التمرد في بلاده بهزيمة نكراء في ليبيا	Tikbali: We warn Erdogan that as well as the pandemic, corruption and the onset of a rebellion in his country will lead to a bitter defeat in Libya
Week 2	صحيفة تركية: الحكومة التركية إستغلت جائحة كورونا لتوزيع الأسلحة على الميليشيات الإرهابية في ليبيا	Turkish newspaper: Turkish government using the Corona wave to distribute weapons to terrorist militias in Libya

Figure 28.

The table below highlights the top 10 most-interacted-with public Libyan Facebook pages for covid-19 discourse across the reporting period:

Page Name	Total Interactions	Interaction Rate	Total Posts	Video Views	Post Performance	Page Likes
المركز الوطني لمكافحة الأمراض _ ليبيا	5.78M	1.44%	399	3.27M	1.1x	1.01M
218TV	2.00M	0.08%	710	20.10M	2.2x	3.70M
سلام - Salam	886,281	0.14%	456	3.87M	1.2x	1.42M
ليبيا 24 - 24 Libya	734,942	0.05%	1,915	38,882	-1.3x	719,230
صحيفة المرصد الليبية	532,213	0.22%	272	525,630	-1.2x	902,358
Libya Alahrar TV - قناة ليبيا الأحرار	510,325	0.06%	491	3.42M	-1.1x	1.84M
عاجل ارض الشريف الإخبارية	467,634	0.39%	295	45,550	1.0x	409,157
ليبيا فقط	304,870	0.3%	48	48,832	1.1x	2.09M
اخبار ليبيا	303,128	0.02%	1,759		-1.0x	1.03M
ليبيا الآن	257,021	0.01%	948	2.17M	1.0x	1.97M

Figure 29.

The Libyan Center for Disease Control draws the majority of Facebook discussion, primarily with posts such as this one that details the latest information regarding the fight against covid-19 in Libya and the associated testing regime:



A number of the comments make religiously tinged appeals to spare Libya from the pandemic, but the majority take issue with the failure of the authorities to secure Libya's borders or to test and isolate new arrivals. There is a particular focus on and anger towards Turkey as a source of the virus, while a handful of comments object to the economic restrictions intended to stem the spread of the virus as harmful to Libyans' ability to earn a living.

The majority of the remaining most-interacted-with posts are feel-good stories of acts of humanity, such as this post from Salam:



Nearly all the coded comments rejoice at the news of this elderly woman's recovery, but many despair at sight of medical staff not wearing masks and sharing communal food with their hands in the accompanying photos. Some of these users suggest that this is indicative of the dysfunction of Libyan society and is evidence for why the virus is spreading.

This video posted by 218tv that shows an elaborate dance routine performed by people in protective clothing:



The majority of responses are positive, expressing amusement at the performance, but a handful of responses lament the sight of such frivolity at a time of immense suffering for many. The health-based misinformation videos from 218tv identified in the previous reporting period are either no longer being published or have failed to garner similar engagement figures since May 2020.

This post from OnlyLibya claims that, as of 16 May, covid-19 was yet to spread in Libya, highlighting that the occasional piece of misinformation is still reaching a wide audience:



The post refers to a popular video in which a doctor (pictured in the post above) gives advice regarding how to slow the spread of the virus. Many of the comments praise the doctor and his video and call for his advice to be given national prominence. Almost a third of comments were negative and included claims that only God will protect Libya from covid-19, that Libya has been spared from the virus because of its backwardness and poor infrastructure, that the doctor is spreading fear rather than information, or that the virus is caused by 5G mobile signals.

Aside from updates from the National Center for Disease Control (NCDC) and positive stories, posts of condolence and occasionally mourning are the other main theme of Facebook discussions.

On Twitter there were 134,000 mentions of covid-19-related topics across the reporting period, a precipitous drop from 289,000 from January to April. The most-interacted-with post came from the political activist Ebrahim Gasuda, who seemingly mocks paranoia over UAE-Israeli covid-19 cooperation as a cover for escalating hostility towards Libya:



As previously mentioned, this account is potentially magnified by coordinated inauthentic activity. Otherwise, the majority of the most-interacted-with posts concern the handling of the covid-19 pandemic by Libyan state structures. Many focused on the situation in the southwestern city of Sabha, for which they expressed fear at the deteriorating situation in late May/early June:



The impact of the rapid eight-fold increase in confirmed cases of covid-19 is clear from the overall trend of engagements across the reporting period:




Figure 30.

The other spike seen is the result of widespread outrage after the NCDC's announcement that it had run out of covid-19 test kits. Libyan Twitter users highlighted this as a sign of the endemic corruption of Fayeze al-Sarraj's government and lamented the alleged looting of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dinar. The Deputy Minister for Health of the GNA, Mohammad Haitham, was repeatedly singled out as a corrupt figure.



Across the reporting period, it is clear that the positive pieces and scare stories about covid-19 being produced en masse by 218tv in the early months of the pandemic gradually lost their audience over June and July. What remains is an empathetic and concerned group of Libyans online that is keen to follow and promote the reality of the pandemic. There remain individual instances of high-interaction misinformation (and the potential for prolific mid- and low-level interaction misinformation), but covid-19 discourse in Libyan online spaces appears to have somewhat reoriented itself away from frivolous or misleading content and into being an effective information-sharing space that has the potential to serve as a productive source of knowledge. Nevertheless, these spaces are not wholly reliable, as conspiracy theories, from malicious creation and weaponisation of the virus by the GNA, Turkey or the US, to 5G fearmongering and anti-Semitism, remain prevalent in discussion among social media users

REFLECTIONS ON THE REPORT'S FINDINGS

As the armed conflict around Tripoli has ended, online discourse moved away from the binary political dynamics of Fayed al-Sarraj and Khalifa Haftar seen in previous reporting periods. This is shown through the resurgence of pro-Gaddafi voices as well as relatively high engagement with the National Conference for the Activation of the Independence Constitution and the Restoration of the Constitutional Monarchy of Libya. This mirrors a growing frustration with the current political situation and a search for alternatives.

The reporting has also shown that while Sarraj and Haftar remain the main drivers of engagement online, there is evident discontent with both controversial figures. The support they held from their respective followers during the armed conflict has dwindled, leaving room for other currents in the Libyan scene.

Foreign-backed TV channels continue to be prominent actors online and drivers of the most-engaged-with content. The increasing presence and influence of Russian-backed media has put forward and strengthened a new and stronger pro-Gaddafi narrative. It further shows the increasing Russian interest in Libyan local affairs.

Interest in UNSMIL has declined as the head of mission role remains vacant. There is low interest in UNSMIL and a general continued negative attitude and disengagement towards the UN. Although it was previously highlighted that this could indicate a lack of trust towards the UN, UN agencies who provide humanitarian assistance are more positively perceived.

There is little interest in important political developments which have taken place at the highest international level such as the Berlin conference process and ceasefire agreement. This lack of interest could represent a general disconnect between the ordinary Libyan and what happens at the international level, as well as a lack of confidence that the outputs of such events could affect the reality on ground.

With the end of the armed conflict in Libya and ongoing discussions about a possible election, Facebook discussions on elections are increasing although it remains relatively low compared to other topics. Many of these discussions are taking place within Facebook groups which we are unable to monitor in the scope of this analysis.

The reported incident of an elderly woman who posted a video on Facebook as a response to the hate speech she had received for an earlier video in which she criticises Libya's political situation and was subsequently attacked with derogatory words such as 'whore', demonstrates the hate speech that Libyan women can be faced with on social media.

METHODOLOGY

Zinc Network adopted a research method combining both quantitative and qualitative data analysis. Boolean search queries were created in order to collect data for the following categories, which reflected the situation in Libya for the reporting period in question: a) Security and Conflict; b) Elections and the Constitution; c) UN; d) Covid-19. We conducted desktop research to compile a list of terms relevant to each category and the Libyan context, followed by an iterative process of data cleaning in order to ensure the Boolean queries produced relevant data. (See the glossary below for more details on the search query terms.)

These search queries were used to collect data from social media intelligence and content analysis tools CrowdTangle and BuzzSumo. BuzzSumo enabled Zinc to run category keyword searches against a pre-defined list of Libyan news outlets (see glossary), to ascertain the leading stories and URLs shared across Facebook (in this instance ranked by total Facebook engagements). A Facebook engagement is either a reaction, comment or share attributed to an article. Libya-specific domains (.ly) were first identified through BuzzSumo's top-level domain filter, then combined with a manually derived list of Libyan sources that do not use the .ly domain. From this data-led approach, Zinc was able to qualitatively analyse the leading news stories for each category and derive key narratives and insights.

CrowdTangle enabled Zinc to run category keyword searches against a pre-defined list of public Libyan Facebook pages (see glossary), to ascertain the leading posts across the platform ranked by total interactions. As above, Zinc was able to qualitatively analyse the leading stories for each category.

Meltwater enabled the same category searches to be set up to collect data directly from Twitter's application programming interface (API), limited to Libyan tweets only (based on users self-locating in Libya). This enabled Zinc to analyse the data and compare and contrast it with the Facebook insights and narratives. Specifically, Meltwater enabled Zinc to shed light not only on how Twitter conversations trended over time, but also on influential voices on the platform in terms of volume and impressions, top performing content, and the most shared websites and social networks across Twitter discussions.

Due to Facebook's API restrictions, Facebook analysis was restricted to public pages, meaning that any personal messages or posts shared in private groups remained beyond the scope of this report.

The lists of publications and Facebook pages below were compiled through desktop research that aimed to provide a representative picture of the Libyan digital media space. This was established through evaluation of previous research projects, both published by DRI and not, and through our own investigation of the Libyan media landscape. All Libyan domains (.ly) were included in our data searches and therefore specific examples are not included on the lists.

Articles are chosen for analysis based on their performance relative to comparable articles, as determined by data produced by the social media intelligence and content analysis tools. Sentiment analysis was conducted through comment coding, for which the top 50 comments for the Facebook posts referenced within the report (as per Facebook's "most relevant" algorithm) were evaluated for content, tone and political sentiment.

GLOSSARY

"بالغارات" OR "رماية الان" OR "صوت رماية" OR "طائرة استطلاع" OR "طائرة بدون طيار" OR "غارات" OR "غارة"
OR "قذائف" OR "فصف" OR "اطلاق نار" OR "الحشد" OR "انفجار" OR "انفجارات" OR "حزام ناسف" OR "سيارة
مفخخة" OR "عبوة ناسفة" OR "ناسفة" OR "تظاهرات" OR "تظاهرات" OR "مسيرة" OR "مسيرة" OR "جرحي" OR
"شهيد" OR "شهداء" OR "الامن" OR "امن" OR "إرهاب" OR "إرهابية" OR "إرهابي" OR "داعشي" OR "داعش"
OR "الدولة الاسلامية" OR "ضربات جوية" OR "هدنة" OR "ارتداد" OR "ردة" OR "القوات الجوية" OR "القوات
الخاصة" OR "قوة درع ليبيا" OR "غرفة عمليات ثوار ليبيا" OR "تفجيرات" OR "مسلحون" OR "مسلحين" OR "مسلح"
OR "لاجئون" OR "لاجئين" OR "لاجيء" OR "طائرة المقاتل" OR "قاذفة" OR "قاذف الهاون" OR "المدفعية" OR
"صواريخ" OR "صاروخ" OR "قذيفة موجهة مضادة للدبابات" OR "بي ام بي" OR "دبابة" OR "بي تي ار" OR "هليكوبتر"
OR "هليكوبتر" OR "طائرة عمودية" OR "صاروخ ارض جو" OR "المدفعية المضادة للطائرات" OR "دبابات" OR "قنبلة
يدوية" OR "في انفجار قنبلة يدوية" OR "ار بي جي" OR "بصاروخ" OR "اسقطت الطائرة" OR "تحطم طائرة" OR "طائرة
محطمة" OR "نسف" OR "بحرر" OR "قوة الحماية في طرابلس" OR "الجيش الليبي الوطني" OR "الثوار" OR "السراج"
OR "مجلس النواب" OR "المجلس الأعلى للدولة الليبية" OR "حزب العدالة والبناء" OR "حفر" OR "القوات المسلحة العربية
الليبية" OR "جامعة الدول العربية" OR "لواء ثوار طرابلس" OR "حكومة الوفاق الوطني" OR "الجيش الوطني الليبي" OR
"تحرير طرابلس" OR "المجلس الرئاسي"

Elections and the Constitution:

"القضاء الاعلى او القضاء العالي" OR "انتخاب" OR "الدستور" OR "استفتاء" OR "استفتاء دستوري" OR "انتخابات"
OR "مرشح انتخابات" OR "ناخبين" OR "ناخبون" OR "مصوتون" OR "مصوتين" OR "دستوري" OR "حزب سياسي"
"سيف الإسلام"

UN:

"الأمم المتحدة" OR "يو ان اس ام أي ال" OR "مهمة الأمم المتحدة لمساندة ليبيا" OR "غسان سلامة" OR "سلامة"
"مجلس الامن الدولي" OR "يو ان اس سي" OR "مجلس الامن التابع للأمم المتحدة" OR "قمة الامم المتحدة" OR "محادثات
سلام" OR "مفاوضات سلام"

Covid-19:

"91 كوفيد" OR "كوفيد-91" OR "كوفيد" OR "فيروس كورونا" OR "كورونا" OR "كورونا فايروس" OR "كورونا فايروس"
OR "العزل الذاتي" OR "عزل ذاتي" OR "عزل" OR "العزل" OR "الحجر الصحي" OR "ro" OR "الحجر" OR "الوباء" OR "وباء"
OR "مختبر" OR "مختبر بيولوجي" OR "الإغلاق الكامل" OR "إغلاق كامل" OR "خليق في الحوش" OR "التباعد
الاجتماعي" OR "تباعدا اجتماعي" OR "5 جي"

Non-.ly Publications:

www.libyaalkhabar.com
www.218tv.net
libyaalkhabar.com
almarsad.co
www.libya24.tv
www.eanlibya.com
www.tanasuh.tv
www.addresslibya.com
almashhadlibya.com
almotawaset.com
libyaalahrar.tv
www.jamahiriya.tv
www.manlibya.com
www.libyaschannel.com
www.akhbarlibya24.net
libyanbusiness.tv

www.libyaalhadath.net
www.alwatanlibya.net
https://www.afriqatnews.net/
http://www.ajwa.net/
http://www.newlibya.net/
https://www.libya-news.com/
http://libyaalsalam.net/
https://libyaalmokhtar.com/
http://www.fassatonews.net/
http://www.alrasedalliby.com/
https://libyan-cna.net/
https://nabaa.tv/
www.ljbctv.tv
arraedlg.net
www.jana-ly.co

Facebook Pages:

https://www.facebook.com/pg/afriqatnews/posts/?ref=page_internal
https://www.facebook.com/LibyaAlkhabar/
https://bit.ly/3kRAefs
https://www.facebook.com/218tv
https://www.facebook.com/libyaakhbar/
https://www.facebook.com/Albawaba.eg/
https://www.facebook.com/HunaLibya.ly/
https://www.facebook.com/ObservatoryLY/
https://www.facebook.com/libya24tv/
https://www.facebook.com/OnlyLibya/
https://www.facebook.com/eanlibya/
https://www.facebook.com/tanasuh.channel
https://www.facebook.com/heema.sa3d/
https://www.facebook.com/ElectronicCounterterrorism/
https://www.facebook.com/Libyan.Address.Journal
https://www.facebook.com/almashhadlibya/
https://www.facebook.com/AnalLiby.Wmarati.Liybia/
https://www.facebook.com/almotwasetnews/
https://www.facebook.com/AlAraby.ar
https://www.facebook.com/AlArabiya/
https://www.facebook.com/warinformationdivision/
https://www.facebook.com/Tkyhrogkshy2/
https://www.facebook.com/lyobserver.arabic/
https://www.facebook.com/LibyaAlAhrarTV/
https://www.facebook.com/BjohaBenghazi/
https://bit.ly/35QU0Sc
https://www.facebook.com/saitara1999/
https://www.facebook.com/ayonbenghazi8/
https://www.facebook.com/AJEL.Ardalsharif.News/
https://www.facebook.com/akbaragalawamoakdh/
https://bit.ly/3jT4oh8
https://www.facebook.com/exclusivefromtripoli/
https://bit.ly/3o0hr7b
https://www.facebook.com/Watan.AL.Harabah.Channel/
https://www.facebook.com/LibyaPostNews/
https://www.facebook.com/AlHadath/
https://www.facebook.com/libyamandela/
https://www.facebook.com/libyaalain/
https://www.facebook.com/libyaschannel/
https://www.facebook.com/akhbarlibya24/
https://www.facebook.com/elkul.libya/
https://www.facebook.com/iqtisadia/
https://www.facebook.com/LibyaAlhadathLive/
https://www.facebook.com/Lebdafm/
https://www.facebook.com/TodayLibyaCom/
https://www.facebook.com/alwataniya.ly/
https://www.facebook.com/101.1FM/
https://www.facebook.com/ccmce/
https://www.facebook.com/Media.Center.2019/
https://www.facebook.com/gna.libya/
https://www.facebook.com/LibyanGovernment/

<https://www.facebook.com/Burkanly/>
<https://www.facebook.com/K21S21/>
<https://bit.ly/3jMQywn>
<https://bit.ly/3kLl5MO>
<https://www.facebook.com/DawnOfLibya/>
<https://bit.ly/3mIqm8v>
<https://bit.ly/383G75Z>
<https://www.facebook.com/khalifa.alabeidi/>
<https://www.facebook.com/the.general.staff.of.the.libyan.armed.forces/>
<https://www.facebook.com/ayonbenghazi8/>
<https://www.facebook.com/Oil.Crescent.News/>
<https://www.facebook.com/Wakalt.Akbaar.Benghazi/>
<https://www.facebook.com/ban.wae.new/>
<https://www.facebook.com/LibyaAlhadathLive/>
<https://www.facebook.com/jana2.ly/>
<https://www.facebook.com/aljamahiriya>
<https://www.facebook.com/ahmedgaddafaddem/>
<https://www.facebook.com/network.salam/>
<https://www.facebook.com/modonlibya/>
<https://www.facebook.com/libyaalaantv/>
<https://www.facebook.com/arraedntv/>
<https://www.facebook.com/NCDC.LY/>
<https://www.facebook.com/meandmywifeLibyan/>
<https://www.facebook.com/hassan.tatanaki.9/>
<https://www.facebook.com/mediawarinformationdivision/>
<https://bit.ly/2GjvZWk>
<https://www.facebook.com/Benghazi.libaa/>
<https://bit.ly/3mGT5dV>
<https://bit.ly/2HTGIRZ>
<https://www.facebook.com/alwataniya.ly/>
<https://www.facebook.com/radaa.abuslim/>
<https://www.facebook.com/iqtisadia/>
<https://bit.ly/3l2AQ1S>
<https://www.facebook.com/Ministry.of.Interior.libya/>
<https://www.facebook.com/lananewspage/>
<https://www.facebook.com/libyaschannel/>
<https://www.facebook.com/akhbarlibya24/>
<https://www.facebook.com/elkul.libya/>
<https://www.facebook.com/iqtisadia/>

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Images: unsplash.com, pexels.com